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Editors’ Summary
Absent legislative intervention, CAA regulation of GHGs 
is moving beyond mobile sources to the industrial and 
power facilities that emit significant U .S . GHG emis-
sions . The authors analyze the mechanisms available to 
EPA for regulating such sources, and identify one, NSPS, 
as the most predictable, likely, and practical, i .e ., know-
able, pathway . Indeed, EPA announced in late 2010 that 
it intends to pursue this pathway . Based on the legal 
structure of the NSPS and EPA’s traditional approach, 
the authors analyze a hypothetical GHG NSPS for one 
sector, coal electricity-generation . This analysis indicates 
that efficiency improvements and perhaps biomass cofir-
ing could be implemented through the NSPS, yielding 
modest but meaningful emissions reductions . Trading 
could also rein in costs . Though analysis is limited to one 
sector and does not include modeling of costs, it suggests 
that CAA regulation, though inferior to comprehensive 
climate legislation, could be a useful tool for regulating 
stationary source GHGs .
Until late 2009, most observers considered it likely that the U .S . Congress would pass some form of comprehensive climate legislation, including an 
economywide cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) . That did not happen in 2009—though the U .S . 
House of Representatives passed such a bill (Waxman-
Markey, H .R . 2454), the U .S . Senate did not . It is now 
unclear when, or even if, Congress will pass any compre-
hensive legislation .
This legislative inertia has resulted in a shift in interest 
to actions by the U .S . Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) to regulate GHGs under its existing Clean Air Act 
(CAA)1 authority . Under President Barack Obama, EPA 
has proposed and finalized rules requiring the reporting of 
GHG emissions and an “endangerment finding” that per-
mits and requires the regulation of GHG emissions from 
cars and trucks (mobile sources, in CAA terminology) . 
This endangerment finding was followed by the recent EPA 
announcement of new GHG emissions standards for these 
mobile sources .
The steps EPA will take as it moves to regulate mobile-
source emissions are relatively well understood . Substantial 
uncertainty remains, however, over how EPA will use its 
CAA authority to regulate stationary sources—the power 
plants and industrial facilities responsible for the majority 
of U .S . GHG emissions; particularly existing, unmodi-
fied sources . A recent settlement agreement provides some 
broad clarity, but details remain obscure .
This Article attempts to resolve some of that uncertainty 
by analyzing a set of plausible pathways EPA may use to 
regulate stationary-source GHG emissions under the CAA . 
Section III describes each of these pathways, and Section 
IV offers evidence that points to one program in particular, 
the new source performance standards (NSPS), as the most 
likely, predictable, and practical vehicle for CAA regula-
tion of GHGs . In short, the NSPS are the knowable path-
way for regulation of GHGs under the CAA .
1 . 42 U .S .C . §§7401-7671q, ELR Stat . CAA §§101-618 .
Author’s Note: This Article was written and released for discussion 
in April of 2010, and accepted for publication in October of the 
same year. In December 2010, EPA announced terms of a settlement 
agreement with plaintiff states in which the Agency agreed to 
implement new source performance standards (NSPS) for certain 
classes of greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters beginning in 2011. This 
confirms the broad predictions made in this Article. The Agency has 
not begun the rulemaking process or released any details regarding 
these GHG NSPS, however. This Article therefore serves both to 
explain the legal and policy justifications for the regulatory path 
apparently chosen by the Agency and to predict the specifics of that 
path. The authors appreciate the assistance of Erin Mastrangelo, and 
funding from Mistra’s Climate Policy Research Forum (Clipore).
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EPA could choose from a variety of specific measures 
under its general NSPS authority, with increasing strin-
gency and reach across existing stationary sources . These 
measures range from performance standards that vary in 
stringency and are defined over relatively narrow categories 
of emissions sources to more flexible standards that allow 
some form of trading to achieve compliance with an aver-
age performance standard . It is also possible that the NSPS 
program could be used as a vehicle to introduce a sector-
based cap-and-trade program .
In Section V, we assess the magnitude of emissions 
reductions that could be achieved under the most mod-
est of the possible approaches outlined in Section IV . We 
examine only coal-fired electricity-generating units, but 
within this single, narrowly defined class of emitters, we 
discuss regulatory options that could achieve emissions 
reductions equivalent to roughly 3% of total U .S . emis-
sions at what we believe would be modest cost and with 
minimal disruption to current capacity use . Although we 
do not explore the more expansive options here, substan-
tially greater reductions would be possible from NSPS for 
other source categories, such as petroleum and gas refin-
eries, more stringent performance standards, and/or from 
trading across source categories that would allow for sub-
stitution from coal to natural gas . An analysis of the costs 
and emissions reductions of all of these measures would 
require modeling that is beyond the scope of this Article .
In discussing an NSPS approach, we do not intend to 
present it as the ideal or even necessarily preferable path-
way for controlling GHG emissions . New, comprehensive 
climate change legislation from Congress would provide a 
superior alternative . It is also possible that other pathways 
under the existing CAA could produce better emissions 
results, could achieve results at lower cost, might be more 
likely to survive legal or political challenges, or could oth-
erwise constitute a better approach for EPA . In our analysis 
of possible GHG NSPS pathways, we are careful to point 
out both the associated advantages and the disadvantages . 
Rather than advocating for NSPS regulation of GHGs, our 
goal is to offer an analysis of what appears to us to be the 
most likely route for EPA to choose . Some studies from 
EPA2 and from academic sources3 discuss the pathways 
2 . See generally Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Regulating Green-
house Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed . Reg . 44354, 44476-
520 (July 30, 2008) (hereinafter ANPR) .
3 . See, e.g., Larry Parker & James E . McCarthy, Congressional Research 
Service, Climate Change: Potential Regulation of Stationary 
Greenhouse Gas Sources Under the Clean Air Act, Report R40585 
(2009), at 1; Inimai M . Chettiar & Jason A . Schwartz, New York Uni-
versity School of Law, The Road Ahead: EPA’s Options and Obliga-
tions for Regulating Greenhouse Gases (2009), at v, http://www .poli-
cyintegrity .org/publications/documents/TheRoadAhead .pdf; Timothy 
Mullins & Michael Rhead Enion, (If ) Things Fall Apart: Searching for Op-
timal Regulatory Solutions to Combating Climate Change Under Title I of the 
Existing Clean Air Act if Congressional Action Fails, 40 ELR 10864, 10881 
that are available to EPA in general terms, but few if any 
discuss any of those pathways in depth . It is this gap that 
we aim to begin to fill with this Article .
We argue that a modest GHG regulatory program 
under existing CAA NSPS authority could be effective 
without deviating greatly from traditional EPA practice 
under this authority . We further find that such a program 
could achieve meaningful emissions reductions in the elec-
tricity sectors (and potentially elsewhere, though we do not 
study other sectors) . Although a more detailed empirical 
exercise is necessary to fully determine the costs of regula-
tion, it is our sense that a modest regulatory approach is 
unlikely to impose large costs . Moreover, the inclusion of 
emissions trading mechanisms could probably be used to 
reduce the costs of more stringent regulation even under 
the CAA, although such mechanisms would probably be 
limited to individual sectors of the economy .
I. A Brief Overview of the CAA and 
GHGs
Until and unless Congress enacts legislation that changes 
EPA authority, the existing CAA gives EPA authority to 
regulate GHG emissions .4 Furthermore, EPA has already 
begun to regulate GHGs from some sources under that 
statute . Understanding how EPA may regulate GHG emis-
sions, therefore, requires at least a basic understanding of 
the CAA .
The CAA is a massive, complex regulatory statute with 
a wide variety of interconnected programs covering differ-
ent types of pollutants . The principal division within the 
statute is between the regulation of stationary emissions 
sources (power plants, industrial facilities, and so forth), 
primarily under Title I, and mobile emissions sources 
(vehicles and vehicle engines) under Title II . In the past 
year, EPA has moved quickly toward the regulation of 
GHGs from mobile sources, but has provided only a lim-
ited discussion of regulation of stationary-source GHGs . 
Because stationary sources emit the majority of GHGs in 
the United States, how EPA chooses to regulate them is by 
far the most significant open question in any analysis of the 
Agency’s GHG regulatory efforts .
A. The Regulatory Process so Far
Although our focus in this Article is on stationary-source 
regulation, the story of EPA regulation of GHGs begins 
with, and to date has been dominated by, mobile-source 
(Sept . 2010); Roger Martella & Matthew Paulson, Regulation of Greenhouse 
Gases Under Section 115 of the Clean Air Act, Daily Env’t Rep ., Mar . 9, 
2009, at 1 .
4 . See Massachusetts v . EPA, 549 U .S . 497, 528-29, 37 ELR 20075 (2007) .
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regulation . The most recent and significant moves by the 
Agency toward GHG regulation are the December 2009 
endangerment finding under §202 of the CAA5 and subse-
quent regulation of mobile sources through fleet emissions 
standards for vehicle manufacturers .6 The endangerment 
finding—and the long series of steps leading up to it, 
including the well-known Massachusetts v. EPA decision by 
the Supreme Court7—did not directly impose any regu-
lation of stationary sources . However, EPA’s recent action 
establishing GHG emissions limits for cars and trucks will 
lead to stationary source regulation through the CAA per-
mitting programs and, most likely, through the NSPS pro-
visions of the Act .
1. The Foundation—Massachusetts v. EPA
EPA action on GHGs under the CAA, and in 
particular its focus to date on mobile sources, 
has been driven by the Supreme Court case that 
forced the Agency to consider regulating GHGs, 
Massachusetts .8 That case was filed by states 
with a narrow claim—that EPA must regulate 
mobile-source GHGs . The Supreme Court ruled 
that GHGs are pollutants under the CAA and, 
thus, that the Agency is required to determine 
whether GHGs emitted from vehicles endanger 
public health or welfare (or at least explain why 
it would or could not do so) .9 The December 
2009 endangerment finding therefore fulfills 
the Court’s mandate from Massachusetts . No 
equivalent judicial mandate exists for the regu-
lation of stationary sources .
Massachusetts and the regulatory steps under-
taken by EPA in response are not, however, 
irrelevant to an analysis of the regulation of 
stationary sources . The critical finding by the 
Court that, contrary to EPA’s position at the 
time, GHGs are “pollutants” for purposes of the CAA,10 
makes the regulation of stationary sources possible . EPA 
must therefore eventually consider the regulation of sta-
tionary-source GHG emissions, even if the Court decision 
does not explicitly instruct it to do so .11
5 . See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases 
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed . Reg . 66496 (Dec . 15, 
2009) .
6 . See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Corpo-
rate Average Fuel Economy Standards, EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0472 (to be 
published in the Federal Register), available at http://www .epa .gov/otaq/cli-
mate/regulations/ldv-ghg-final-rule .pdf .
7 . 549 U .S . 497, 37 ELR 20075 (2007) .
8 . Id .
9 . Id. at 533-35 .
10 . Id. at 528-29 .
11 . Id. at 533-35 .
2. The CAA Process: From Endangerment to 
Regulation
Nearly all of the regulatory programs in the CAA follow 
a similar process . EPA first identifies emissions of a pollut-
ant from a set of sources . It then undertakes an analysis of 
whether these emissions present a danger to “public health 
or welfare,” generally a purely science-based determina-
tion . If, based on this analysis, the Agency concludes that 
a pollutant endangers public health or welfare, this endan-
germent finding is both a threshold requirement and a trig-
ger—it is both necessary and sufficient for the Agency to 
regulate . The Agency retains some discretion over exactly 
how to regulate in the wake of an endangerment finding, 
but it does not have the option of refusing to regulate at all .
Chart 1 shows how this process has happened so far 
for GHG regulation and how it will continue to unfold . 
The decisions made and steps taken by EPA to date show 
how the Agency is well on its way to regulating mobile-
source emissions . As discussed above, Massachusetts set the 
regulatory process into motion, primarily by determining 
that GHGs are pollutants within the scope of the CAA . 
Since that case, EPA has moved to regulate mobile-source 
emissions with the recent endangerment finding for such 
sources and the joint EPA and U .S . Department of Trans-
portation rule regulating mobile-source GHG emissions 
issued in March 2010 .12
12 . See Proposed Rulemaking to Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 74 
Fed . Reg . 49454 (Sept . 28, 2009); Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, supra 
note 6 .
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3. Agency Discretion
Future possible regulatory actions that might be pursued 
to regulate stationary sources are illustrated in the remain-
der of Chart 1 . The major uncertainty is which of the sev-
eral CAA regulatory programs for stationary sources EPA 
will select .
Most of those who have studied the process of EPA reg-
ulation of GHGs under the CAA have explicitly or implic-
itly assumed that EPA has discretion to choose among 
these programs . This is not necessarily the case, however . 
Nathan Richardson13 and others argue that interconnec-
tions among different sections of the CAA (and, therefore, 
different regulatory programs) may limit EPA’s discretion . 
Steps that the Agency has already taken or will soon take 
may foreclose certain regulatory options and/or compel 
others .14 EPA admits that this kind of triggering occurs 
between some programs (most notably that regulation of 
mobile sources triggers a permitting process for stationary 
sources, as discussed in Section III .C . below), but claims 
to have general discretion to choose among regulatory pro-
grams for stationary sources .15
Here, we assume that EPA has broad discretion to 
choose among CAA regulatory programs, and that the 
Agency’s goal is to regulate GHGs under the CAA as 
efficiently as possible (to achieve the greatest emissions 
reductions at the lowest cost) . The goal in this Article is 
to examine plausible candidates for such an ideal CAA 
GHG regulatory scheme .
II. Stationary Source Regulation Under 
the CAA
Stationary source regulation under the CAA comes in 
three forms: air quality standards; technology standards; 
and permits for new and modified sources . Most (but 
not all) of these programs involve some split of regulatory 
authority between federal and state governments, termed 
cooperative federalism . The CAA has also traditionally 
been a command-and-control statute, but amendments in 
1977 and 1990 and EPA actions over the same time period 
have brought the limited application of incentive-based 
approaches to some aspects of CAA regulation . A substan-
13 . Nathan Richardson, Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Clean Air Act: 
Does Chevron v . NRDC Set EPA Free?, 29 Stan . Envtl . L .J . 283 (2010) .
14 . For example, two environmental groups, the Center for Biological Diver-
sity and 350 .org, have petitioned EPA, claiming that the Agency is legally 
required to regulate GHGs under the national ambient air quality standards 
(NAAQS) program . See Center for Biological Diversity and 350 .org, Peti-
tion to Establish National Pollution Limits for Greenhouse Gases Pursuant 
to the Clean Air Act (Dec . 2, 2009), at 15, available at http://www .bio-
logicaldiversity .org/programs/climate_law_institute/global_warming_liti-
gation/clean_air_act/pdfs/Petition_GHG_pollution_cap_12-2-2009 .pdf . 
Nathan Richardson, supra note 13, writes that such challenges stand a sig-
nificant chance of success in the courts .
15 . See ANPR, supra note 2 (stating that “we explore three major pathways 
that the CAA provides for regulating stationary sources, as well as other 
stationary source authorities of the Act, and their potential applicability to 
GHGs”) .
tial portion of our analysis will be dedicated to whether and 
how such approaches might be implemented for GHGs .
A. Air Quality Standards
Air quality standards are the core regulatory mechanism 
in the CAA . The primary vehicle for such standards, the 
national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS), is the 
most well-known program in the statute and the source 
of much of its regulatory impact . However, the standards 
have some conceptual inconsistencies and practical imple-
mentation problems that make them less than ideal for the 
regulation of GHGs .
1. NAAQS
In the NAAQS program, as the name implies, a single 
air quality standard for each regulated pollutant is set for 
the entire country . The goal of the ensuing regulation is 
to ensure that areas that fail to attain this standard (non-
attainment areas) are brought into compliance, and that 
areas in which the standard is currently met (attainment 
areas) continue to do so in the future . The NAAQS pro-
gram is governed by §§108-110 of the CAA .16
NAAQS regulatory responsibilities are divided between 
EPA and state governments—the NAAQS program is 
the primary example of the CAA’s cooperative federalism 
approach . EPA is responsible for listing pollutants to be reg-
ulated under the program and for setting NAAQS them-
selves, whereas states are responsible for on-the-ground 
regulation of emitters to comply with the standards .
The regulatory process for NAAQS is as follows . First, 
EPA must determine whether a given pollutant endangers 
public health or welfare—this is the NAAQS endanger-
ment finding, analogous but not identical to that required 
for mobile sources .17 Pollutants for which a positive endan-
germent finding has been made are listed as criteria pol-
lutants and the Agency must determine what air quality 
standard is necessary to protect public health or welfare .18 
In principle, the Agency could set separate standards to 
protect health and welfare—these are termed primary 
(health) and secondary (welfare) standards .19 In practice, 
however, EPA almost never does this, and the only differ-
ence between the two types of standard is that the CAA 
does not include a timeline for compliance with second-
ary standards .20 Both of these initial determinations—
endangerment and the level at which a NAAQS is set—are 
designated in the CAA as purely scientific .21 EPA is not 
permitted to consider compliance costs .22 To date, EPA has 
set a NAAQS for only six pollutants: sulfur dioxide (SO2); 
16 . CAA §108(b) .
17 . CAA §108(a) .
18 . CAA §109(a) .
19 . CAA §109(a)(1)-(2) .
20 . CAA §172(a)(2)(A) .
21 . CAA §§108(a), 109(a) .
22 . Whitman v . Am . Trucking Ass’n, 531 U .S . 457, 486, 31 ELR 20152 
(2001) .
Copyright © 2011 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
41 ELR 10102 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 2-2011
tropospheric ozone; nitrogen oxides (NOx); par-
ticulate matter (PM; two particle sizes are regu-
lated separately); lead; and carbon monoxide .23
Once a NAAQS has been set, states are 
responsible for compliance; EPA retains signifi-
cant oversight, however . States must document 
how they plan to comply with the standards in 
state implementation plans (SIPs), which EPA 
must approve .24 Each plan must illustrate how 
an area will come into compliance with the (pri-
mary) NAAQS within five years, though EPA 
can extend that period to 10 years .25 In practice, 
EPA may create a model plan that states can adopt 
with the knowledge that it will be approved by the 
Agency, though they are free in principle to devi-
ate from the model as long as EPA agrees that the 
alternative plan is consistent with the CAA and 
will attain the standard .26 States that fail to plan 
adequately are subject to sanctions, including the 
potential loss of federal highway funding .27 EPA 
must also establish a federal implementation plan 
(FIP), in such cases .28 Once an SIP has been approved, states 
are responsible for implementing it . States have their full 
arsenal of regulatory powers in implementing their plans—
they have both significant power and significant flexibility . 
This flexibility is not unlimited, however . For example, in 
nonattainment areas, states are required to impose reason-
ably available control technology (RACT) on emitters .29 
The process of NAAQS regulation is detailed in Chart 2 .
Despite the apparent rigidity of the NAAQS regula-
tory process, EPA succeeded in implementing an emissions 
trading system through NAAQS in the late 1990s . Con-
tinued failure to reach attainment for the ozone NAAQS 
in the 1990s led EPA to require a large group of states to 
resubmit SIPs that would address problems arising from 
the transport of NOx emissions between states . In the call 
for revised SIPs (known as the NOx SIP call), EPA offered a 
model rule that the states could adopt and thereby opt into 
an interstate emissions trading system .30 All of the affected 
states adopted the model rule, and the result is the NOx 
Budget Program, a trading system that has widely been 
viewed as both effective at reducing emissions and efficient 
at doing so at low cost .31 It provides a precedent for the abil-
ity of EPA and regulating states to create a trading program 
23 . 40 C .F .R . §§50 .2-50 .16 (Westlaw 2010); see also U .S . EPA Air and Radia-
tion, National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), http://www .epa .
gov/air/criteria .html (last visited Dec . 12, 2010) (listing NAAQS for the six 
criteria pollutants—carbon monoxide, lead, nitrogen dioxide, particulate 
mattter (PM10), PM2 .5, ozone, and sulfur dioxide) .
24 . CAA §110(a), (k) .
25 . CAA §172(a)(2)(A) .
26 . See, e.g., U .S . EPA, Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking 
for Certain States in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for 
Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone (the NOx SIP Call), 63 
Fed . Reg . 57356, 57456-76 .
27 . CAA §179 .
28 . CAA §110(c) .
29 . CAA §172(c)(1) .
30 . See generally NOx SIP Call, supra note 26 .
31 . Dallas Burtraw & Sarah Jo Szambelan, U .S . Emissions Trading Markets for 
SO2 and NOx, Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 09-40 (2009) .
under the NAAQS program .32 However, EPA’s subsequent 
2005 Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR)33—modeled in 
some respects on the NOx SIP call—was remanded to EPA 
by the U .S . Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
(D .C .) Circuit in 2008 . The court raised significant ques-
tions with respect to elements of emissions trading under 
NAAQS .34
2. Limitations of NAAQS for GHGs
Despite the instrumental role of the NAAQS program 
in CAA regulation, implementing a NAAQS for GHGs 
may pose significant difficulties . Some of these problems 
are conceptual—the NAAQS framework does not fit the 
problem of GHG emissions nearly as well as it does tra-
ditional pollutants . Other problems are practical—it may 
be difficult to impose effective regulation through the 
NAAQS program .
Conceptually, problems arise from the global character 
of the GHG/climate change problem . For traditional pol-
lutants, concentrations are greater near (or downwind of) 
emitters—pollution is primarily a local or regional prob-
lem . In such cases, setting a national air quality standard 
and allowing state governments to regulate makes sense . 
32 . The D .C . Circuit’s decision in North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F .3d 896, 908, 38 
ELR 20172 (D .C . Cir . 2008) (per curiam) remanding the Clean Air Inter-
state Rule (CAIR) draws into question at least some elements of emissions 
trading schemes under NAAQS .
33 . See generally Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter 
and Ozone (Clean Air Interstate Rule), 70 Fed . Reg . 25162 (Dec . 29, 2005) 
(creating new interstate trading programs under NAAQS and modifying 
existing programs)
34 . See generally id. (holding, among other concerns, that the CAIR rule failed to 
guarantee that under the trading program, emissions from one state would 
not “contribute significantly” to nonattainment of NAAQS in downwind 
states) . It is possible that a GHG trading program would not have similar 
problems, since it would not need to be based on states’ contributions to 
nonattainment (or interference with maintenance) elsewhere—since GHGs 
are globally mixed in the atmosphere, any local GHG emissions affect local 
concentrations as much as they affect concentrations elsewhere .
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Those states with significant emitters and/or high levels of 
pollution can and must impose stricter regulations . Emis-
sions that are transported across state borders make this 
somewhat more difficult (notably for SO2, NOx, PM, and 
ozone) . This difficulty has inspired EPA to attempt to cre-
ate interstate trading programs including the NOx Budget 
Program and the more recent CAIR, the latter of which has 
come under significant legal challenge, as discussed above . 
GHGs are different, however . For the most part, atmo-
spheric concentrations are uniform globally and not related 
to local emissions . This creates problems at two points in 
the NAAQS process . First, it is not clear at what level a 
NAAQS for GHGs should be set . This determination must 
be scientific rather than policy-driven, and may prove diffi-
cult . Second, because concentrations of GHGs are uniform 
nationally, whatever level is chosen by EPA for NAAQS 
will result in the entire country either being in attainment 
or nonattainment . If the entire country is in attainment, 
relatively little regulation can be imposed . If the entire 
country is in nonattainment, what are individual states 
supposed to plan to do in their SIPs to address their failure 
to meet NAAQS? Nothing any individual state could do 
would have any significant effect on local GHG concentra-
tions . In short, the cooperative federalism approach that 
has been successful in regulating other NAAQS pollutants 
seems unsuitable for GHGs .
NAAQS is also a slow process . Although there is no 
guarantee that other CAA programs or even programs 
implemented in new climate legislation would oper-
ate quickly, the NAAQS process is particularly tortuous . 
Multiple levels of government are involved, with con-
siderable back-and-forth between them . The CAA itself 
imposes a rigid structure on the process, with a require-
ment for public comment and an opportunity for litigation 
at many stages . The process of listing a pollutant, setting 
a NAAQS, requesting SIPs, approving them, implement-
ing regulation, and verifying attainment takes many years . 
Legal challenges, disputes between states and EPA, and 
bureaucratic foot-dragging can slow this process down 
substantially . While EPA does have substantial discretion 
over the timing of many steps in the process, it (and the 
states) must complete all of these steps . Neither the Agency 
nor the states have moved quickly or nimbly in regulating 
other pollutants under the NAAQS program .
GHG regulation under the NAAQS program could 
also present political problems for EPA . The NAAQS pro-
gram is considered by many to be an expansive, complex, 
and relatively intrusive regulatory program . Regulation 
of GHGs via the NAAQS program would necessarily be 
economywide (encompassing all stationary sources) and 
nationwide . Such regulation is likely to be controversial, 
and more likely to spur congressional action, although it 
is plausible that Congress might react by passing compre-
hensive climate legislation that would supersede NAAQS .
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that very little support 
exists for the regulation of GHGs via the NAAQS program 
within EPA or most parts of the policy community . The 
climate bills proposed in both the House (Waxman-Mar-
key) and Senate (Kerry-Boxer) would explicitly take away 
EPA’s authority to regulate GHGs through the NAAQS 
program . Most environmental groups oppose a GHG 
NAAQS as well, favoring new legislation and/or regula-
tion through other CAA programs—though one organi-
zation has petitioned EPA, claiming that the Agency must 
issue a NAAQS .35 In the proposed tailoring rule, EPA 
noted that there is no NAAQS for carbon dioxide (CO2; 
or the other primary GHGs) and that it does not plan to 
promulgate one .36
3. International Emissions Regulation—An 
Alternative Path?
NAAQS is the only CAA regulatory program based on 
air quality standards currently in place . No other major, 
detailed program exists, but a short (two-paragraph) sec-
tion of the CAA—one never used by EPA—may provide 
an alternative basis for regulation based on air quality 
standards .37 This section (CAA §115) is directed at interna-
tional emissions—that is, U .S . emissions that cause envi-
ronmental problems elsewhere . Superficially, this seems 
ideal for the GHG problem . The section is extremely short 
and lacks detail, however . This could be a virtue, in that 
it leaves significant discretion to EPA to devise regulation, 
but it also exposes such regulation to greater legal scrutiny .
International emissions regulation under §115 has only 
two requirements: first, EPA must determine that emissions 
originating in the United States endanger public health or 
welfare in another country .38 This determination can be 
based on reports from an international agency or certifi-
cation by the Secretary of State .39 For GHGs, the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report is 
probably sufficient to meet this requirement . Second, the 
country affected by U .S . emissions must give the United 
States reciprocal rights—that is, the country must control 
its emissions that endanger public health or welfare in the 
United States .40
Once these requirements have been met, EPA can 
require states to revise their SIPs (which all states have 
as a result of the regulation of other pollutants through 
the NAAQS program) so as to “prevent or eliminate the 
endangerment” from GHGs .41 No further guidance as to 
what kind of regulation is permitted is given in the stat-
35 . See Center for Biological Diversity and 350 .org, Petition to Establish Na-
tional Pollution Limits for Greenhouse Gases Pursuant to the Clean Air 
Act (Dec . 2, 2009), at 15, http://www .biologicaldiversity .org/programs/
climate_law_institute/global_warming_litigation/clean_air_act/pdfs/Peti-
tion_GHG_pollution_cap_12-2-2009 .pdf .
36 . See U .S . EPA, Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Green-
house Gas Tailoring Rule, 74 Fed . Reg . 55292, 55297 (2009) (hereinafter 
tailoring rule) .
37 . CAA §115 .
38 . CAA §115(a) .
39 . Id .
40 . Id .
41 . CAA §115(b) .
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ute . The §115 international emissions regulatory process is 
detailed in Chart 3 .42
Some analysts, including a former General Counsel of 
EPA, have argued that this flexibility makes regulation of 
GHG emissions under §115 extremely attractive .43 EPA 
would not need to set a single national air quality stan-
dard for GHGs and might therefore be able to require 
states in their SIPs to make different levels of reductions in 
GHG emissions .44 Because the emissions reductions would 
be determined by how much is necessary to reduce the 
dangers of GHGs internationally, most, if not all, of the 
conceptual problems presented by traditional NAAQS 
regulation are not present . EPA furthermore might be able 
to create an emissions trading system through requested 
changes in states’ SIPs, much as it did for NOx in the SIP 
call, again without the other restrictions of the NAAQS 
process . In short, §115 may allow EPA to tie emissions 
reductions to global, rather than local, risks and give it 
nearly unlimited flexibility to design an efficient and 
effective regulatory program .
The problem with such sweeping regulation under §115 
is that it may not be legal . Courts usually take a dim view 
of attempts by agencies to use short, vague statutory lan-
42 . Some, including EPA itself, have also proposed regulating GHGs under 
§615 of the CAA part of Title VI governing stratospheric ozone protection . 
See ANPR, supra note 2, at 44516 (2008) . This section, like §115, is short 
and appears to give EPA broad authority and discretion—in this case to 
regulate anything that “may reasonably be anticipated to affect the strato-
sphere .” This language in principle provides authority to regulate GHGs 
because all of them eventually make their way to the stratosphere . Attempt-
ing to create a broad regulatory program based on such sparse language 
is relatively unlikely to survive legal challenge, for the same reasons as for 
regulation under §115 . The section may have some promise for the regula-
tion of GHGs that also have effects on stratospheric ozone, however .
43 . See Roger Martella & Matthew Paulson, Regulation of Greenhouse Gases 
Under Section 115 of the Clean Air Act, Daily Env’t Rep ., Mar . 9, 2009, 
at 5, http://www .sidley .com/files/Publication/c789bb2a-7562-4149-8474-
036f21dee348/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/3a6fe43a-22d1-4715-
9f69-04c17efdbd00/GreenhouseGases .pdf .
44 . See generally Hannah Chang, Cap and Trade Under the Clean Air Act?: Re-
thinking Section 115, 40 ELR 10894 (Sept . 2010) .
guage to justify sweeping regulatory changes . 
As Justice Antonin Scalia has put it: “Congress 
does not  .  .  . hide elephants in mouseholes .”45 Such 
broad regulation of GHG emissions under §115 
(indeed, any GHG regulation) is highly likely to 
be challenged in the courts . The same brevity in 
the section that grants EPA the desired regula-
tory flexibility is likely to be a fatal weak point 
in such a challenge . Section 115 may appear to 
provide a perfect foundation for GHG regula-
tion, but EPA would risk putting great effort 
into developing a regulatory program only to 
discover that its foundation is built on sand .
B. Technology Standards
Although air quality standards (NAAQS) 
receive significant attention, technology stan-
dards are an equally important part of regula-
tion under the CAA . Furthermore, some of 
these programs may present a more favorable 
path for the regulation of GHGs .
1. NSPS
Under §111 of the CAA, EPA has the authority to set 
technology-based standards for new stationary sources and 
existing sources that make major modifications . EPA also 
has the authority to set guidelines for states to use in setting 
technology standards for existing sources . The program 
created by this section is called the NSPS, even though this 
section also provides (in some circumstances) authority for 
the regulation of existing sources .
While air quality standards operate on pollutants, the 
NSPS under the CAA operate on classes of emitters . These 
classes are termed source categories . EPA has significant 
discretion to specify these categories . Setting source catego-
ries requires EPA to make an endangerment finding—the 
Agency must determine that emissions from the source cat-
egory endanger public health or welfare . This is analogous 
to other endangerment findings, in that it is both a thresh-
old requirement and a trigger for mandatory regulation . 
Unlike the NAAQS endangerment finding, however, EPA 
must find endangerment under the NSPS for each source 
category (each type of emitter), not for each pollutant .
EPA has already made an endangerment finding based 
on other pollutants and has listed more than 60 source cat-
egories and subcategories that cover all major types of sta-
tionary sources, including coal, oil, and gas power plants; 
refineries; cement plants; and many other industrial facili-
ties . Therefore, no new endangerment finding would be 
necessary to regulate GHGs through the NSPS program 
45 . Whitman v . Am . Trucking Ass’n, 531 U .S . 457, 468, 31 ELR 20512 (2001) 
(emphasis added) .
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for these sources . EPA can also list additional source cat-
egories after making an endangerment finding .46
Once a source category has been identified and an 
endangerment finding made, EPA must issue performance 
standards for new and modified sources within that cate-
gory . These standards must “reflect[ ] the degree of emission 
limitation achievable through the application of the best 
system of emissions reduction”47 that has been “adequately 
demonstrated .” EPA is permitted to consider costs when 
setting the standards . The NSPS do not require emitters to 
install a particular technology—they only require emitters 
to meet an emissions standard that EPA determines based 
on technological options . In practice, emitters may or may 
not have much choice over what emissions control mea-
sures to take, and they assume some risk if they choose 
a measure that differs from predetermined options . As 
a result, the NSPS may force the widespread adoption 
of specific technology used by only a few plants in the 
industry (or in a closely related industry) . EPA also 
periodically reviews the NSPS—at which time it may 
determine that technological progress justifies a stricter 
standard . In this sense, the NSPS are moving targets . 
(NAAQS can change as well, usually in response to new 
scientific information about risks from pollutants .)
Once the NSPS for a source category have been set, 
they apply to all new sources in the category and any 
sources that undergo a “major modification .” What 
modifications qualify as “major” is a topic of signifi-
cant contention, and sometimes litigation, between 
the Agency and emitters; EPA has, as a result, issued 
detailed regulatory guidelines for this determination . 
Emitters must show compliance with the NSPS before 
construction can proceed .
The NSPS program, as described to this point, applies 
only to new and modified sources and is primarily fed-
eral (EPA can delegate enforcement authority to states) .
Under some conditions, existing sources are also regu-
lated under the NSPS program under §111(d) of the CAA . 
Unlike the primarily federal NSPS for new and modified 
sources, §111(d) regulation delegates planning and enforce-
ment to the states in a manner similar to that described 
above for NAAQS regulation . However, this author-
ity to regulate existing sources with performance stan-
dards is only available for pollutants not regulated under 
the NAAQS program or as toxic pollutants under §112 
(discussed in Subsection III .B .2 . below) . If a pollutant is 
regulated under either of these programs, no performance 
standards can be implemented under the NSPS for existing 
sources . This may be a barrier to integrated approaches that 
might otherwise combine the regulation of GHGs under 
the NSPS and the NAAQS programs (or under §112) for 
existing sources .
46 . In fact, EPA is probably legally required to include GHG emissions stan-
dards in future revisions of NSPS for existing-source categories . See infra 
notes 53-56 and accompanying text .
47 . CAA §111(a)(1) .
Assuming that a pollutant is not regulated under these 
other programs, §111(d) of the CAA provides that EPA 
must create a system under which states will create per-
formance standards for existing sources and submit plans 
to implement the standards (similar to SIPs under the 
NAAQS program) . The Agency has the responsibility and 
the authority to approve or disapprove these plans, and 
implement a federal plan if states fail to adequately set stan-
dards . Subject to EPA approval of their plans, states have 
significant flexibility to set standards for existing sources . 
For example, they are explicitly authorized to take into 
account how much useful life remains for a source .48 The 
NSPS regulatory process is detailed in Chart 4 .
The current precedent for emissions trading under the 
NSPS program is limited . In principle, EPA could imple-
ment trading within a source category by claiming that 
trading itself was the “best system of emission reduction .” 
Whether this is a permissible reading of the statute has not 
been determined by courts . Evidence suggests that it may 
be permissible, however . First, any challenge would have 
to overcome the substantial deference shown to agency 
readings of their own statutes under Chevron v. NRDC .49 
Second, EPA issued a regulation establishing a trading 
program for mercury emissions from electricity-generating 
units in 2005, purporting to use CAA §111(d) authority .50 
Although the D .C . Circuit rejected EPA’s mercury rule, 
it did so on other grounds—the court gave no indication 
that emissions trading under the NSPS program was itself 
48 . CAA §111(d)(1)(B) .
49 . In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc ., 467 U .S . 
837, 14 ELR 20507 (1984), the Supreme Court held that agency interpre-
tations of ambiguous statutory language prevail unless they are not “reason-
able” or “permissible .”
50 . See generally U .S . EPA, Clean Air Mercury Rule, Basic Information, http://
www .epa .gov/mercuryrule/basic .htm (stating that the rule was “issued un-
der  .  .  . section[ ]  .  .  . 111 of the law”) .
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problematic (though it is of course possible that the court 
simply did not reach the issue) .51 A small trading program 
also exists for NOx emissions for one source category of 
emitters, solid waste combustors, though EPA’s authority 
for this program is only derived partially from §111 .52
Further, EPA is arguably required to issue GHG 
NSPS . Because Massachusetts determined that GHGs 
are pollutants, and the mobile-source rules have further 
made them pollutants regulated under the CAA, any 
new NSPS probably must include performance standards 
for GHGs . EPA, environmental groups, and some states 
have disagreed in the past about whether GHGs must 
be included in NSPS revisions . In the first such revi-
sion after Massachusetts was decided, for the petroleum 
refinery source category, EPA received comments claim-
ing that it was required to include GHG regulations in 
the new NSPS .53 The Agency responded that it was not 
required, and in any event lacked enough time to do so 
(the revised NSPS were finalized four weeks after the 
decision in Massachusetts) .54 Many of EPA’s arguments in 
declining to include GHGs, such as lack of time and the 
fact that, at the time, GHGs were not regulated under 
the CAA, are no longer valid—though EPA’s broad 
claim that it has general discretion in deciding whether 
NSPS will be set for a given pollutant remains . The 
political and legal situations have changed, however, 
and EPA is much more inclined to regulate GHGs with 
CAA tools than it was under the Bush Administration 
in 2008 . EPA may believe that, having issued a posi-
tive GHG endangerment finding and regulated GHGs 
under the CAA, it must now include GHGs in future 
NSPS revisions .55
Recent EPA actions appear to ref lect such a shift 
in agency position . A group of states challenged EPA’s 
reliance on this discretion in 2008,56 and in late 2010, 
EPA announced that it had settled with the states and 
agreed to implement GHG controls via new (§111(b)) 
and existing-source (§111(d)) NSPS on at least some 
51 . See generally New Jersey v . EPA, 517 F .3d 574, 38 ELR 20046 (D .C . Cir . 
2008) . EPA, state plaintiffs challenging the CAMR rule, and environmen-
tal-group intervenors each briefed the issue of trading under §111(d) in 
varying degrees of detail . Unsuprisingly, EPA concluded that it was legal, 
while plaintiffs and intervenors claimed it was not . Our sense is that the 
Agency has the better of this argument, but the fact that it is untested in 
court does present real legal risk for a §111(d) trading program . This risk is 
discussed further in Section IV .C . below .
52 . See 40 C .F .R . §60 .33b(2) (stating: “A State plan may establish a program to 
allow owners or operators of municipal waste combustor plants to engage 
in trading of nitrogen oxides emission credits . A trading program must be 
approved by EPA before implementation .”) .
53 . See Standards of Performance for Petroleum Refineries; Final Rule, 73 Fed . 
Reg . 35838, 35838 (June 24, 2008) .
54 . Id . at 35838-60 .
55 . Roger Martella, former U .S . EPA General Counsel, has stated that EPA will 
likely take the position that, after the December 2009 endangerment find-
ing, it must include GHGs in future NSPS revisions . See Robin Bravender, 
EPA Notice Sets Stage for Regulation Writing, Lawsuits, Greenwire, Dec 15, 
2009, available at http://www .eenews .net/public/Greenwire/2009/12/15/3 .
56 . See New York Office of the Attorney General, Press Release, Cuomo Files 
Lawsuit to Force Bush EPA to Control Global Warming Pollution From Big 
Oil Refineries, Aug . 25, 2008, available at http://www .ag .ny .gov/media_cen-
ter/2008/aug/aug25b_08 .html .
source categories .57 According to the settlement agree-
ment, proposed rulemakings will be announced in 
mid-2011 .58
The NSPS program is the most plausible and practical 
candidate for regulation of GHGs from stationary sources, 
chiefly because it lacks the conceptual and practical prob-
lems presented by NAAQS and the legal difficulties pre-
sented by §115 on international emissions . In Sections IV 
and V of this Article, we present a possible pathway to such 
regulation under the NSPS program and discuss its advan-
tages and disadvantages in more detail .
2. Hazardous/Toxic Air Pollutant Regulation
Section 112 of the CAA creates a separate technology-
focused program for the regulation of certain toxic or haz-
ardous emissions .59 This hazardous air pollutant (HAP) 
program is an important component of the CAA and 
covers a vast range of pollutants that present significant 
health risks . The program gives EPA broad authority to 
directly regulate toxic substances—states do not play a 
significant role .
Although an understanding of toxic emissions regula-
tion under §112 is important to understanding the CAA as 
a whole, it is not likely to be a useful vehicle for the regula-
tion of most GHGs . The program is designed for highly 
toxic substances emitted in relatively low quantities—most 
GHGs are not toxic and are emitted in large quantities .
Very stringent “major source” emissions thresholds are 
the first problem with regulating GHGs as toxic pollutants . 
Section 112 regulations apply to all “major sources” of pol-
lutants listed under the section, with major sources defined 
as those emitting 10 tons per year or more of any single 
toxic pollutant or 25 or more tons per year of any combina-
tion of listed toxic pollutants .60 Regulation of CO2 under a 
program with such low emissions triggers is impractical to 
the point of absurdity, because it would affect tens of mil-
lions of small sources .
Statutory requirements for very strict regulation pres-
ent another problem for regulating GHGs as toxic pollut-
ants . Section 112 requires EPA to set emissions standards 
at the “maximum degree of reduction in emissions” that 
the Agency determines is achievable .61 For existing sources, 
this is defined as the maximum degree of emissions reduc-
tion achieved by the best 12% of existing sources .62 In any 
case, this level of mandatory reduction does not allow for 
the consideration of cost .63 Furthermore, §112 provides no 
legal basis for emissions trading .
57 . See Settlement Agreement Between State Petitioners, Environmental Peti-
tioners, and EPA, Dec . 10, 2010, at 3, available online at http://www .epa .
gov/airquality/pdfs/boilerghgsettlement .pdf .
58 . Id .
59 . CAA §112 .
60 . CAA §112(a)(1) .
61 . CAA §112(d)(2) .
62 . CAA §112(d)(3)(A) .
63 . Id. Note that CAA §112(d)(2) does permit EPA to consider costs when 
defining “maximum degree of reduction in emissions” generally, but that 
the maximum achievable control technology floors specified in CAA 
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In short, the HAP program is a poor fit for general GHG 
regulation under the CAA . It may be a useful option for 
some minor GHGs that are toxic, but the HAP program 
does not provide the policy flexibility necessary for a cost-
effective approach to the regulation of major GHGs .
C. Permitting
The CAA creates programs for permitting new and modi-
fied stationary sources that operate in parallel to the air 
quality standards (NAAQS) and technology standards 
(NSPS and HAP) . The two main permitting programs 
include one for major new or modified sources and one for 
major existing sources . In other words, the CAA creates 
a requirement for both construction and operating per-
mits . The construction permitting program is termed new 
source review (NSR) .64 The operating permit program is 
referred to by the part of the CAA that created it: Title V .65 
Permitting under the CAA is very complex . What follows 
is only a very broad overview .
The Title V operating permitting program, at least in 
theory, does not impose new requirements on the station-
ary sources that are required to obtain permits—it provides 
an enforcement tool rather than separate regulation . Title 
V permits are broad in that they are intended to specify all 
applicable CAA requirements for the plant .66 Despite not 
imposing new requirements, the permitting process can be 
complex . Permits may take more than a year to obtain, the 
cost for the process can be high, and administrative costs 
are shifted entirely onto emitters .
The NSR program for construction permits, on the 
other hand, does impose new requirements . Permitting 
under NSR requires both site-specific, technology-based 
review of the control technology proposed by the source 
and a demonstration that the plant will not create or exac-
erbate violations of air quality standards in the area sur-
rounding the plant .67 NSR requirements differ depending 
on whether the area in which the plant is located is classi-
fied as an attainment area or a nonattainment area under 
the NAAQS program . The control technology review will 
result in direct, substantive regulatory requirements . The 
NSR technology-based review often results in more strin-
gent standards than those required by the NSPS program .
In the case of GHGs, plants subject to NSR will be sub-
ject to control requirements independent of EPA decisions 
on whether and how to implement a GHG control strategy 
for stationary sources under other applicable provisions 
of the CAA . EPA’s position is that as soon as any restric-
tions placed on emissions of a pollutant under any CAA 
authority become effective, sources that emit that pollut-
§112(d)(3) are explicitly defined based on emissions from existing sources, 
irrespective of cost .
64 . CAA §160-169, §173 . NSR is sometimes also referred to as PSD, for pre-
vention of significant deterioration—though this term technically applies 
only to areas in attainment with respect to a pollutant regulated under 
NAAQS .
65 . CAA §501-506 .
66 . CAA §502(f ) .
67 . CAA §165 .
ant are subject to permitting—even if the regulation does 
not apply to them directly .68 For GHGs, this means that 
mobile-source regulation will trigger NSR and Title V per-
mitting for covered stationary sources .
The inclusion of GHGs in the NSR process will result 
in significant additional regulation for large GHG emit-
ters (with the determination of which sources are suffi-
ciently large a significant issue, as discussed below) . Even 
though such emitters are already subject to NSR review for 
new construction (because they also emit other pollutants 
regulated under the CAA), that process will now involve 
control technology review for GHGs . It is not yet clear 
what this control technology requirement will look like, 
but EPA (and the states) will make such determinations 
on a case-by-case basis . It is also possible that what would 
in the past have been considered trivial modifications or 
“routine maintenance” to existing plants, insufficient to 
trigger modified-source NSR, would now be considered 
major modifications because of their impact on GHG 
emissions . This would result in much more frequent NSR 
for these sources .
Another problem arises, however, from the CAA defi-
nition of what a “major” source is (recall that only major 
sources need NSR or Title V permits) . The threshold 
beyond which sources are classed as major is defined in the 
CAA at 100 tons of annual emissions (250 tons in some 
cases) .69 If a source emits more than this threshold of any 
pollutant regulated under the CAA, it is a major source 
and must obtain a permit . This threshold was set with tra-
ditionally regulated pollutants in mind—SO2, PM, NOx, 
and so forth . It presents a significant problem if GHGs are 
regulated because GHG emissions, particularly CO2, are 
emitted in much larger volumes . Fossil-fuel power plants 
and some industrial facilities emit tens of thousands of 
tons of CO2 annually . A threshold of 100 (or 250) tons 
would include not only these large facilities, but also many 
smaller facilities that are not currently subject to CAA reg-
ulation . Large office and apartment buildings, hospitals, 
commercial facilities, and other emitters could exceed this 
threshold . This is a significant problem both for regulators 
and emitters . Regulators, often states under authority del-
68 . See PSD Interpretive Memo From Stephen L . Johnson, EPA Administrator, 
to EPA Regional Administrators (Dec . 18, 2008), at 6, http://www .epa .gov/
NSR/documents/psd_interpretive_memo_12 .18 .08 .pdf (stating that EPA 
interpretation of language in the CAA and its own regulations requiring 
NSR for facilities emitting pollutants “subject to regulation” under the CAA 
means that NSR applies to “each pollutant subject to either a provision in 
the Clean Air Act or regulation promulgated by EPA under the Clean Air 
Act that requires actual control of emissions of that pollutant”) . EPA further 
has interpreted this requirement to mean that NSR is required once regula-
tions of a pollutant actually become effective . In the case of GHGs, this will 
be January 2, 2011 . See Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations 
That Determine Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 
75 Fed . Reg . 17004, 17004 (2010) .
69 . CAA §169(1) . Note that this is the threshold requirement for inclusion 
in the PSD/NSR permitting program . For existing sources undergoing 
modification, however, the EPA retains some discretion in defining the 
relevant threshold . The statute includes no threshold for modifications, 
but the agency and courts have accepted a de minimis exception . It is 
unclear what level of GHG emissions would qualify as de minimis absent 
an agency determination .
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egated by EPA, are not administratively prepared to deal 
with such a volume of permit requests . Small emitters are 
unlikely to have good information about permit require-
ments and would face significant costs in time and money .
EPA is attempting to address this looming problem by 
restricting permit requirements, at least initially, to sources 
emitting more than 75,000 tons of GHGs in its “tailor-
ing rule .”70 Such tailoring directly contradicts the statu-
tory language in the CAA, however, and its survival in a 
court challenge is therefore questionable . EPA has claimed 
“administrative necessity” and “absurd results” legal 
defenses against such a challenge, but these doctrines are 
rarely applied and are best considered a legal last resort . If 
the tailoring rule fails, however, Congress would probably 
act to avoid the consequences for small emitters discussed 
above . Big changes to the CAA would not be necessary—a 
simple change in the threshold for permitting to a higher 
level for GHGs would be sufficient . This would not address 
the burden of more frequent NSR for major sources, how-
ever . NSR would, therefore, operate as an independent and 
continuing regulatory requirement on large GHG sources, 
even in the absence of GHG regulation with air quality or 
technology standards (NAAQS or NSPS) . The NSR per-
mitting process under the CAA is detailed in Chart 5 (the 
Title V process is separate and not shown) .
III. The Knowable Path
Among the many pathways toward regulation of existing-
source GHG emissions under the CAA presented in the 
previous section, we believe it is possible to identify one 
that is the most likely and predictable, i .e ., “knowable,” 
pathway, worth describing in more detail . We begin this 
70 . See U .S . EPA, Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Green-
house Gas Tailoring Rule (Final Tailoring Rule) . 75 Fed . Reg . 31514, 31516 
(2010) .
section with a discussion of the near-future timeline for 
EPA regulation of GHGs and proceed by discussing how 
that knowable pathway—NSPS regulation—fits into that 
timeline and how it would likely develop .
A. Stationary-Source GHG Regulatory Timeline
With so many regulatory programs under the CAA poten-
tially affecting different classes of stationary sources, it is 
useful to consider the timeline along which regulation is 
likely to unfold . Chart 1 above provides a general over-
view of this process and the order in which steps are likely 
to be taken . Mobile-source regulation was implemented 
in March 2010 . Now that final mobile-source regulations 
have been issued, GHGs will become a regulated pol-
lutant under the CAA (once these regulations become 
effective in January 2011), triggering the NSR and Title 
V permitting processes .71 In a related action in March 
2010, EPA determined that the NSR permit program 
would be triggered when the mobile-source rule becomes 
effective .72 Any new stationary sources or existing sources 
undergoing major modifications after this date would be 
subject to NSR review . At least initially, the tailoring 
rule would restrict permit requirements to large emitters . 
Whether this remains the case in the long term hinges 
on the result of a legal challenge to that rule . 
That challenge is likely to begin shortly after 
the NSR process itself, but may not be resolved 
for months or years .
Proceeding separately, NSPS regulation is 
likely to be the next event to unfold . Under 
§111, EPA is required to regularly update the 
NSPS for listed source categories of emissions 
of pollutants regulated under the Act .73 As these 
NSPS revisions proceed, EPA will likely include 
performance standards for GHGs; indeed the 
Agency’s December 2010 settlement commits 
the Agency to this pathway for at least some 
source categories . New NSPS are scheduled to 
be issued for several significant categories of 
GHG emitters over the next two years; the first 
will be an NSPS for electric utility-generating 
units, followed by NSPS for oil and gas refiner-
ies .74 The Administration’s 2011 budget request 
to Congress includes a request for support of 
71 . See Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations, supra note 68, at 
17004 . The PSD program primarily applies to criteria pollutants covered 
by NAAQS . However, some of the substantive NSR requirements of the 
PSD program—notably the best available control technology (BACT) pro-
visions—also apply to regulated pollutants for which there are no NAAQS 
(and no other statutory exemptions under §§112 and 211(o) from PSD) . 
See ANPR, supra note 2, at 44497 .
72 . See Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations, supra note 68, at 
17004 . See also Letter from Lisa Jackson, EPA Administrator, to Sen . Jay D . 
Rockefeller IV (Feb . 22, 2010), at 3, available at http://epa .gov/oar/pdfs/
LPJ_letter .pdf .
73 . CAA §111(b)(1)(B) .
74 . See U .S . EPA, Regulatory Plan and Semiannual Regulatory Agenda, Fall 
2009, at 7 (2009), available at http://www .epa .gov/lawsregs/documents/
regagendabook-fall09 .pdf .
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NSPS standard-setting for GHGs, which provides a fur-
ther signal that the NSPS pathway is an option under seri-
ous consideration by the Agency .75
By early 2011, therefore, the general character of GHG 
regulation under the CAA should be clear—mobile-source 
regulation will be in place, the GHG NSR permitting 
under the tailoring rule will be underway (though related 
litigation will be a possible source of uncertainty), and 
NSPS for some source categories may begin to reveal EPA’s 
approach to technology standards for GHGs .
The NSPS pathway probably has the broadest support 
among the various parts of the policy community . As noted 
above, little support exists for regulation of GHGs via the 
NAAQS program within or outside of EPA . In addition, 
a robust NSPS program regulating both new and exist-
ing sources may provide a way to avoid the problems and 
disadvantages that attend the NAAQS process . A GHG 
NAAQS is still a long-term possibility . Even if it is relatively 
unpopular now, litigation over whether a GHG NAAQS 
is required will likely continue . Even if EPA eventually 
decides to or is forced to implement a GHG NAAQS, that 
regulatory process will take years . Consequently, we focus 
on NSPS regulation as the most likely, and most readily 
knowable, path for regulation under the CAA .76
B. The Traditional NSPS Regulation Framework
NSPS regulation (under §111) offers the potential for a 
comprehensive program of regulation for new and existing 
major stationary sources of GHGs . Traditionally, NSPS 
have been set as technology-based standards for new or 
modified sources . EPA has significant discretion to identify 
the type of facility covered by NSPS regulations in terms 
of setting size thresholds and in determining the types of 
equipment covered . Under this approach, EPA defines cat-
egories or subcategories of covered sources based on spe-
cific characteristics of the industrial process—for example, 
EPA has established standards for catalytic cracking units 
at petroleum refineries and for coal-fired boilers . EPA then 
identifies control technologies that can be applied to the 
source category or subcategory . After consideration of a 
variety of factors (including the cost and effectiveness of 
control), EPA typically establishes a performance standard, 
e .g ., pounds of SO2 per million British thermal units (Btu), 
that the selected control technology can meet .77
Under §111(d), as noted above, EPA sets guidelines for 
state regulation of existing sources . These guidelines would 
be binding requirements that the states must address in 
75 . See Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Govern-
ment, Fiscal Year 2011, at 126 (Feb . 1, 2010) (stating: “The Budget also re-
quests $7 million to develop New Source Performance Standards to control 
GHG emissions from a few categories of major stationary sources .”), http://
www .whitehouse .gov/omb/budget/fy2011/assets/environmental .pdf .
76 . Recall, however, that if the NAAQS process, or regulation under §112 for 
that matter, were to come to fruition, it would block any regulation of exist-
ing sources under NSPS . In other words, NSPS regulation of existing sourc-
es requires that these sources not be regulated in these other CAA programs .
77 . EPA also has the authority to set work practice standards under specific 
conditions .
their state plans . As with the NAAQS planning process, 
state plans under §111(d) are subject to EPA approval, and 
if a state fails to adopt a state plan, then EPA must issue an 
FIP for that state .78 In the past, EPA has issued model plans 
for adoption by the states . These guidelines should follow 
the same basic standard-setting elements used in setting 
NSPS for new and modified sources . Section 111(d) and 
EPA regulations recognize, however, that different, less 
stringent requirements may be appropriate for existing 
sources . As discussed in Section III .B .1 . above, EPA has 
interpreted §111(d) as allowing the adoption of an emis-
sions trading program for NOx emissions from municipal 
waste combustors and for mercury emissions from coal-
fired electric utility units .79 Hence, there is a precedent 
under the NSPS program for implementing a trading 
program for GHGs that would affect both new and exist-
ing sources .
C. Advantages and Disadvantages of NSPS 
Regulation of GHGs
Beyond the fact that they are the most likely next step in 
CAA GHG regulation, NSPS for GHGs offer identifiable 
advantages relative to regulation of GHGs under other 
CAA provisions—as well as their share of disadvantages .
1. Advantages of NSPS for GHGs:
•	 NSPS regulation is an established program .
EPA has significant experience in regulation under 
the NSPS program . NSPS currently regulate many 
emitting sectors of the U .S . economy and cover a 
large number of pollutants . Although §111(d) regu-
lation of existing stationary sources is more limited 
because it does not include those pollutants regu-
lated under the NAAQS program or §112, it also is a 
well-established regulatory mechanism . This experi-
ence and precedent reduces the risk of litigation, and 
the program is familiar to emitters, environmental 
groups, and other stakeholders . Even for untested 
elements of the regulatory approach discussed here 
(notably, emissions trading options under the NSPS 
program), there is significant value to building on 
the foundation of an established regulatory program 
such as the NSPS, rather than creating a program 
out of whole cloth as would have to be done with, 
for example, GHG regulation under §115 (see Sec-
tion III .A .3 .) . As discussed in Section IV .A . above, 
EPA will also likely include GHGs in future NSPS 
for existing source categories .
•	 The NSPS process may be relatively fast . 
78 . CAA §111(d)(2) .
79 . As noted above, the Clean Air Mercury Rule for coal-fired power plants was 
vacated by the D .C . Circuit in New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F .3d 574, 38 ELR 
20302 (D .C . Cir . 2008) . However, that decision did not reach the question 
as to whether EPA has the authority to adopt an emissions trading approach 
under §111(d) .
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Compared to some other regulatory programs under 
the CAA that might be used for GHGs, the NSPS 
may proceed relatively quickly . The NAAQS process 
requires a great deal of time, as discussed in Section 
III .A .2 . above .
•	 The NSPS regulation provides a flexible, cost-effec-
tive approach . 
NSPS regulation has traditionally applied to individ-
ual sectors, as defined by EPA through its regulation 
by source category . This sectoral focus provides EPA 
with flexibility in terms of selecting source catego-
ries for regulation, redefining source categories, and 
identifying size thresholds for regulation . This allows 
EPA to focus on source categories for which regula-
tion is more straightforward or those that present the 
greatest opportunities for emissions reduction (such 
as coal-fired power plants) .
•	 NSPS regulation of existing sources operates through 
the states .
As discussed above, under §111(d) regulation, EPA 
sets guidelines for states to issue performance stan-
dards for existing sources, with the Agency retaining 
approval authority over those policies . This system 
distributes administrative burdens and allows states 
to tailor regulation to local conditions . States also 
have powers that EPA, due to statutory or consti-
tutional limitations, does not . States, for example, 
would probably have the power to auction emissions 
allowances or impose fees .
•	 Emissions trading under the NSPS program is 
legally plausible .
As discussed in Section III .B .1 . above, emissions 
trading under the NSPS program is legally plausible, 
though it has limited precedent . EPA has already 
asserted that it has the authority under §111 to adopt 
an emissions trading approach for new and existing 
sources in the Clean Air Mercury Rule .80 Such an 
approach provides an incentive for sources to iden-
tify and make low-cost emissions reductions beyond 
those required to meet a technology-based standard, 
ensuring a cost-effective regulatory approach . EPA 
also believes that a trading approach could allow it to 
consider larger reductions in GHG emissions than it 
would otherwise be able to require under technology-
based standards and to adopt a phased approach with 
more stringent emissions limits in the later phase(s) .81
•	 EPA may consider costs under NSPS regulation .
Under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
CAA, EPA is forbidden to consider costs under 
80 . See U .S . EPA, Clean Air Mercury Rule, Basic Information, http://www .epa .
gov/mercuryrule/basic .htm (stating: “The Clean Air Mercury Rule estab-
lished a cap-and-trade system for mercury that is based on EPA’s proven 
Acid Rain Program .”) .
81 . ANPR, supra note 2, at 44490 .
the NAAQS program .82 This is not the case under 
§111(d) NSPS regulation—the CAA explicitly allows 
the Agency to consider costs when setting NSPS .83 
Consideration of costs should lead to a more efficient 
regulatory program, especially because regulations 
address sectors independently of each other .
2. Disadvantages of NSPS for GHGs:
•	 NSPS and NAAQS regulation are mutually exclusive .
As discussed above, §111(d) allows regulation of exist-
ing sources only for pollutants that have not been 
listed under §108 (the first step of the NAAQS pro-
cess) . If a NAAQS has been established for a pollut-
ant, no §111(d) regulation is possible, and if §111(d) 
regulation is in place and a NAAQS is subsequently 
issued, that §111(d) regulation is effectively cancelled . 
EPA has no apparent plans to issue a GHG NAAQS, 
but it is possible that it will be forced to do so by 
litigation .84 If this were to happen, any §111 program 
in place would no longer cover existing sources . EPA 
might understandably be concerned about wasting 
its limited resources on creating a program that could 
be killed, not by direct legal challenge, but by such an 
indirect attack .
•	 Emissions trading under the NSPS program carries 
some legal risk .
As discussed above, emissions trading schemes under 
the NSPS program have limited legal precedent . 
Whether the “best system of emission reduction” 
definition of “standard of performance” can be inter-
preted to include emissions trading is an untested 
legal question . EPA is probably entitled to Chevron 
deference on this point, but challenge is likely and 
victory is not certain . If NSPS emissions trading were 
ruled to be incompatible with the CAA, the Agency’s 
regulatory options would be limited to traditional, 
technology-driven performance standards with a cor-
responding increase in sectorwide compliance costs .
•	 NSPS regulation is traditionally highly technical .
Past NSPS regulations have required technical, data-
intensive analysis of regulated source categories to 
identify the technology behind the “best system 
of emissions reduction .” Such analysis is time-con-
suming and places high demands on EPA resources . 
These demands would undoubtedly increase if NSPS 
analyses had to include GHGs as well . 
In addition to these disadvantages in comparison to other 
CAA regulatory programs, all CAA programs are likely to 
82 . See generally Whitman v . Am . Trucking Ass’n, 531 U .S . 457, 31 ELR 20152 
(2001) .
83 . CAA §111(a)(1) .
84 . One of us has written elsewhere that such a challenge would be likely to suc-
ceed . See Richardson, supra note 13 . We assume for purposes of this Article 
that such a challenge would not affect NSPS regulation, either because it 
is rejected by courts or because Congress enacts legislation granting EPA 
discretion not to issue a NAAQS for GHGs .
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be inferior to regulation under new, climate-specific legis-
lation . Because §111 standards are tied to a showing that 
they are based on a demonstrated control technology, the 
emissions reductions achievable under §111 requirements 
may be limited to feasible and cost-effective reductions . 
EPA may not be able to require GHG reductions that are 
as stringent as those that would be mandated by current 
proposed legislation . In addition, because these standards 
are established for source categories that have tradition-
ally been narrowly defined, it may be difficult to expand 
the regulatory scope enough to encourage fuel-switching 
(and it is probably impossible to include alternative, renew-
able sources of energy within the scope of the regulation, 
because such sources emit no pollutants, and are therefore 
outside the scope of the CAA) . EPA also would be unable 
to include international offset mechanisms .85 Regulation 
under the NSPS, or for that matter any CAA program, 
would not solve any difficulties arising from permitting 
requirements .86 Finally, the sectoral approach allows Con-
gress and the regulated entities within the sector to focus 
attention and political pressure on emissions regulations to 
get a better deal .
3. Summary
On balance, we feel that the advantages of NSPS regulation 
outweigh the disadvantages . The benefits of possible emis-
sions trading and the flexibility of NSPS in general seem 
to outweigh the associated legal risks . State involvement 
appears to have more positive than negative impacts . It is 
not our purpose here, however, to advocate on behalf of the 
NSPS as an ideal or even attractive option for GHG regula-
tion under the CAA . Instead, we present these advantages 
and disadvantages to support the claim, further buttressed 
by anecdotal evidence from EPA and President Obama’s 
proposed budget, and most of all from EPA’s recent settle-
ment agreement, that the NSPS program is the likely route 
for regulation of existing GHG sources under the CAA .
IV. Analysis of GHG NSPS in the 
Electricity Sector
In this section, we explore the potential magnitude of 
emissions reductions that might be achieved, and how 
they might be achieved, by regulation under the CAA 
in one important case study—the electricity sector . We 
focus primarily on coal-fired electricity-generation, which 
represents 50% of the electricity-generation and accounts 
for 33% of CO2-equivalent (CO2e) emissions nationally .
87 
Hence, coal-fired electricity is probably the most important 
emissions source for consideration . In addition, extensive, 
detailed data for individual plants exists for this sector . We 
85 . See Nathan Richardson, International Greenhouse Gas Offsets Under the 
Clean Air Act, 40 ELR 10887 (Sept . 2010) .
86 . These potential problems with CAA permitting processes are discussed in 
Section III .C . above .
87 . Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2010 
Early Release, DOE/EIA-0383 (2010) (Dec . 14, 2009) .
focus on the regulation of existing sources in the electricity 
sector because they will constitute the majority of emis-
sions in the sector for decades into the future and because 
the design of regulation to affect existing sources is the 
most challenging part of regulation under the CAA .88
In general, this Article further assumes that no changes 
are made to EPA’s existing NSPS source categories . EPA 
generally has broad discretion to make such changes, 
although it has rarely done so .89 This assumption has been 
made to simplify the analysis, rather than to suggest that 
such changes would be problematic .
A. General Options for NSPS Regulation in the 
Electricity Sector
In its Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM), 
EPA identified several approaches it might take in regulat-
ing GHG emissions from existing power plants under its 
§111(d) NSPS authority, including the following:90
•	 work practice and design standards;
•	 an energy efficiency standard for boilers or power 
plants;
•	 a standard requiring the substitution of biomass 
(cofiring) for some types of coal-fired plants; and
•	 market-based regulatory mechanisms .
We do not address work practice and design standards 
as a regulatory approach, but focus on the other approaches 
listed above: energy efficiency standards, biomass cofiring 
requirements, and market-based regulation .
1. Energy Efficiency Standards
The efficiency of a power plant can be expressed by its heat 
rate, which is the heat input (Btu) required per unit of elec-
tricity output (kilowatt hour [kWh]) . EPA has suggested 
that energy efficiency-based regulation is likely to achieve 
only modest improvements in heat rates (and, consequently, 
relatively modest reductions in GHG emissions) .91 This is 
not a surprising conclusion . Electric utilities already face 
substantial incentives to improve heat rates to reduce fuel 
costs . However, evidence indicates that there is a range of 
performance characteristics across coal-fired power plants, 
and even within specific boiler technology categories .
For existing coal-fired steam-electric plants, options to 
reduce the heat rate include the following: optimizing the 
performance of basic plant systems, improving control sys-
tems, installing high-efficiency electrical components, e .g ., 
motors, and reducing the moisture content of solid fuel . 
EPA has reported that a reasonable expectation for indi-
vidual coal-fired plants would be a 2-5% reduction (rang-
88 . EPA is likely to require new sources to comply with a unit-specific emis-
sions limit .
89 . See Mullins & Enion, supra note 3, at 35-38 .
90 . See ANPR, supra note 2, at 44486-93 .
91 . Id. at 44488 .
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ing up to as much as 10% for a few plants) . Although an 
assessment of broad applicability and cost would need to 
be done, a reasonable expectation for the average fleetwide 
heat-rate reduction is in the range of 2-5% .92 A recent draft 
National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) report 
suggests that even greater improvements, on average, are 
possible .93 Because the emissions from coal-fired genera-
tion at existing facilities are roughly proportional to fuel 
use, an improvement in heat rate leads to a proportional 
reduction in emissions .
In its assessment for the ANPR, EPA did not provide an 
estimate of the likely improvement in heat rate for exist-
ing natural gas-fired electricity-generating plants . Instead, 
EPA simply reported that much more limited options are 
probably available for significant efficiency improvements 
for these plants .94
2. Biomass Cofiring Requirements
Biomass can be mixed with coal and fired in a conventional 
coal-fired boiler up to a limit at which it begins to degrade 
boiler performance .95 On average for most types of boilers, 
roughly 10% of the heat input at a coal-fired boiler can be 
provided through biomass . If one considers biomass to be 
roughly CO2 neutral, the substitution of biomass for coal 
leads directly to net emissions reductions . Because biomass 
supply constraints in some geographic regions limit the 
use of cofiring for existing coal-fired boilers, EPA is likely 
to find it difficult to establish cofiring requirements on a 
plant-by-plant basis . However, EPA has reported that bio-
mass cofiring might replace 2-5% (on a fleetwide basis) of 
the coal used by existing coal-fired plants .96
3. Market-Based Regulation
As discussed above, EPA has interpreted §111(d) as allow-
ing the use of a market-based approach for regulating 
emissions from existing sources . These emissions trad-
ing systems could include cap-and-trade and rate-based 
regulations that allow trading to achieve GHG emissions 
reductions . EPA believes that because of the cost sav-
ings associated with these approaches, it could consider 
deeper reductions through a market-based approach than 
92 . U .S . EPA, Technical Supporting Document for the ANPRM: Sta-
tionary Sources, Section VII, at 16-17 .
93 . NETL, Improving the Efficiency of Coal-Fired Power Plants for Near Term 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions (Feb . 24, 2010) (draft) .
94 . U .S . EPA, Technical Supporting Document, supra note 92, at 16 .
95 . EPA and other studies upon which our analysis is based broadly treat bio-
mass cofiring as carbon-neutral . While our inclusion of biomass in our 
analysis represents tacit acceptance of this position, we are aware that the 
issue is controversial in both the scientific and policy communities . Neces-
sarily, one’s position on the GHG impact of biomass affects interpretation 
of the total emissions reductions we suggest . However, our goal here is 
to analyze CAA regulation based on available data . Attempting to resolve 
scientific controversies is beyond the scope of this Article and, in any case, 
our expertise .
96 . U .S . EPA, Technical Supporting Document, supra note 92, at 17 . See 
also Electric Power Research Institute, Biomass Cofiring Update 
2002, 1004319, Final Report (July 2003) .
it could support through a conventional technology-
based standard .97
As discussed in Section III .B .1 . above, EPA generally 
believes that such programs would be consistent with the 
NSPS provisions of §111 because they would be structured 
to satisfy the definition of “standard of performance .”98 
That is, the trading program would establish a standard for 
emissions that:
•	 reflects the degree of emissions limitation achievable;
•	 constitutes the “best system” of emissions reduction; 
and
•	 has been adequately demonstrated .
With respect to an electricity-sector NSPS specifically, 
the Agency would probably argue that the trading pro-
gram would reflect its judgment on the overall degree of 
emissions reduction that could be achieved by the source 
category . This program would achieve greater emissions 
reductions than could be achieved through the more tra-
ditional approach of establishing a generally applicable 
technology-based standard that applies to each plant . In 
addition, it would provide sources with the flexibility to 
determine the best way to meet the program emissions 
requirements . The resulting program establishes a “price” 
for the control of emissions and provides an incentive for 
innovation . As a result, EPA could plausibly argue, a trad-
ing approach would constitute the “best system” of emis-
sions reduction .
If EPA adopted a cap-and-trade approach for existing 
sources, states would have the responsibility to allocate 
allowances . In previous CAA rules that have authorized 
a cap-and-trade system, EPA has left the allocation deci-
sions to the states . Thus, states would probably determine 
the frequency of allocations, i .e ., a one-time allocation 
or a periodic allocation every, say, three years, the basic 
method of allocation, e .g ., a grandfather approach, updat-
ing output-based allocation, or an auction, and the use 
of set-asides, e .g ., set-asides for energy efficiency projects, 
renewable energy sources, or for new units .99
If, on the other hand, EPA were to adopt a model trad-
ing rule based on a performance standard, then sources 
would earn allowances based on their quantity of produc-
tion at the rate embodied in the performance standard 
(tons/megawatt hour (MWh)) .100 Sources would surrender 
allowances based on their emissions . This approach would 
avoid the contentious allocation issues associated with 
97 . ANPR, supra note 2, at 44490 .
98 . CAA §111(a)(1) .
99 . See, e.g., Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and 
Ozone (CAIR), 70 Fed . Reg . 25278-82 (May 12, 2005); Standards of Per-
formance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Steam 
Generating Units, 70 Fed . Reg . 28627 (May 18, 2005) .
100 . “This type of allocation is labeled “updating” because the award of tradable 
allowances is updated based on current or recent performance rather than 
“fixed” according to a historic measure . In this case, the allocation is “output 
based” because it depends on the production output of electricity . The ini-
tial allocation will be based on the characteristics of the fleet of EGUS when 
the program begins .” Id.
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cap and trade . But it carries its own disadvantages . The 
grandfathered allocation approach implicit in a tradable 
performance standard could lead to changes in revenues 
through increased product prices that greatly outstrip the 
change in costs to comply with the standard, resulting in 
so-called windfall profits .101 In addition, a tradable perfor-
mance standard market may not be as smoothly function-
ing a market as cap and trade . Compliance with a tradable 
performance standard may be less transparent than an 
emissions allowance under a cap-and-trade approach, and 
trading of offsets may require demonstration that a source 
was not going to shut down anyway, giving rise to higher 
transaction costs associated with ensuring the quality of 
the offset credits . Also, it is not clear whether banking of 
offsets would be allowed . In addition, a performance-based 
measure would not cap emissions from the regulated sec-
tor . With growth in production, a corresponding increase 
in energy use and emissions would occur .
B. Opportunities to Reduce Emissions
The primary way that emissions reductions might be 
obtained from the electricity sector is through reducing 
emissions from coal, including fuel-switching from coal 
to natural gas or non-emitting generation sources . How-
ever, as we have noted, under the CAA, EPA might start 
with opportunities for efficiency improvements at exist-
ing facilities .
Figure 1 displays existing coal-fired plants according 
to their heat rate along the horizontal axis .102 The verti-
cal axis is heat input, indicating where most of the genera-
tion occurs . As one might expect, the most heavily used 
plants are among the most efficient, with heat rates less 
than 10,000 Btu per kWh of electricity-generation . How-
ever, the figure displays a substantial right-hand tail, with a 
number of facilities that appear to be outliers with respect 
to their operational efficiencies . The vertical line in the fig-
ure denotes a heat rate of 11,609 Btu per kWh . Five per-
101 . Dallas Burtraw & Karen Palmer, Compensation Rules for Climate Policy in the 
Electricity Sector, 27 J . Pol’y Anal . Mgmt . 819 (2008) .
102 . This analysis uses data on existing electricity-generating units in the lower 48 
states during 2007 . The population is based on units included in the Energy 
Information Administration’s (EIA’s) Annual Energy Outlook 2009 . For each 
of these units, EPA databases provided additional information on efficiency . 
Annual heat input, which is a measure of use, came from EPA’s Continuous 
Emissions Monitoring Database for 2007 . EPA calculates this information 
for all emitting fossil-fired facilities greater than 25 MW by multiplying the 
quantity of fuel used at a unit by the fuel’s heat content . Heat-rate data are 
provided in EPA’s National Electric Energy Data System (NEEDS) . The 
most recent annual data available for NEEDS are from 2006 . For both heat 
inputs and heat rates, EPA reports data at the boiler level for steam units and 
at the generator level for all other units . Observations that did not contain 
data for both heat rate and heat input were dropped for this analysis .
  To calculate CO2 emissions for each of the policy scenarios, we used 
the national average emissions rates as given by Resources for the Future’s 
electricity model, Haiku . The assumed rates are 116 .6 pounds of CO2 per 
million Btu for natural gas-fired units and 208 .4 pounds of CO2 per million 
Btu for coal-fired units . In addition, the scenario in which natural gas-fired 
generation replaces inefficient coal-fired generation assumes that all gen-
eration is replaced by a natural gas plant with a 7,000 Btu/KWh heat rate, 
which is the national average heat rate for natural gas .
cent of total heat input (fuel use) at coal-fired power plants 
occurs at units with a heat rate greater than this amount .
Figure 1. Coal Steam Units—Heat Input-
Weighted Heat Rates
Given that plant operators already face an incentive 
through the cost of fuel to operate efficiently, one might 
expect that the distribution of heat rates would have an 
obvious technical explanation . One plausible explanation 
is that performance characteristics may vary across tech-
nology, vintage, or fuel type . In the Appendix, we illustrate 
that none of these factors appears to explain the distribu-
tion in heat rates across plants . The four most important 
types of boilers—tangentially fired, wall-fired, cyclone, 
and fluidized bed—share similar distributions of heat rates 
and have similar right-hand tails . The least efficient units 
have less control for SO2 than the fleet as a whole, but the 
difference is not convincing . The least efficient units are 
somewhat older than the fleet as a whole, but the distribu-
tion of vintage overlaps for the most part . And an impor-
tant fraction of lignite and waste coal used nationally is 
used at these least efficient units, but that accounts for only 
a small portion of heat input at those units . Other coal 
types are used much more extensively and in rough propor-
tion to the national average .
Having considered technology, vintage, and fuel type as 
potential explanations for the difference in operational effi-
ciency at coal plants, one might also consider institutional 
factors . One such factor is the prospect that modifications 
to improve efficiency might trigger a permitting process 
for NSR for other pollutants that could be time-consum-
ing and costly (see Section III .C . above) . Alternatively, the 
state-level regulatory environment and the firm’s ownership 
structure might provide different incentives for efficiency 
improvements at different plants . Fuel-cost adjustment 
clauses that allow for the automatic pass-through of fuel 
cost into rates is another factor suggested by the NETL .103 
Such provisions remove the risk from price fluctuations; 
unfortunately, such provisions also may remove the incen-
tive to harvest low-cost efficiency improvements . If insti-
tutional factors such as these play an important role in 
perpetuating the operation of relatively inefficient facilities, 
then performance standards might contribute to a remedy . 
103 . NETL, supra note 93 .
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Performance standards focus attention on a specific metric 
that can elevate its visibility within the firm and to regu-
lators . A tradable performance standard should do even 
better, by taking important steps toward a cost-effective 
distribution of emissions reductions .
In summary, we find no obvious explanation for the 
persistence of a right-hand tail in the distribution of heat-
rate efficiency among plants . Further investigation requires 
statistical analysis that is not part of this Article .
An important element of the political debate regard-
ing GHG policy is the potential regional distribution of 
regulatory costs . Substantial interest has focused on the 
disparity in the reliance on coal for electricity-generation 
in different parts of the country . Figure 2 illustrates the 
state-level average heat rate for generation from coal across 
the continental United States . The darker-shaded states 
have higher average heat rates, meaning that more coal is 
used—and more CO2 emissions result—per unit of elec-
tricity generated . Note that regions of the country often 
associated with heavy coal use—midwestern, Appalachian, 
and southeastern states—are not those with the greatest 
average heat rate . In the Appendix, we illustrate a similar 
geographic pattern for the geographic distribution of the 
least efficient plants .
Figure 2. State-Level Average Heat Rate Map
C. Three Plausible Regulatory Scenarios
Based on this information on the possible improvements in 
efficiency in the electric utility sector and the potential use 
of cofiring of biomass, several alternative regulatory sce-
narios under the NSPS program are plausible for reducing 
GHG emissions from the electric utility sector . The first 
two options are performance-based options focused on 
plant efficiency with no trading between plants . The third 
option would establish required reductions in GHG emis-
sions mobilized by a trading approach based on plausible 
reductions from both energy-efficiency improvements and 
the cofiring of biomass .
Option 1. A plant-by-plant-mandated improvement 
(reduction) in heat rate of 5% at coal-fired plants . Some 
improvement at gas- and oil-fired plants might also be 
required .
Option 2. A strict heat-rate efficiency-performance stan-
dard that specifies the minimum performance characteris-
tics for coal-fired boilers . This familiar regulatory approach 
under the CAA would require efficiency improvements or 
shutdown for the 5% least efficient plants . To illustrate 
its effects, we identify a standard applied to the operating 
efficiency of coal-fired power plants set equal to the 95th 
percentile of existing plants, or 11,609 Btu of heat input 
per kWh of electricity production . If all plants with a heat 
rate greater than this threshold were taken out of service, 
it would result in a 5% reduction in emissions from coal-
fired generation . These plants generate 4 .3% of electric-
ity from coal; the difference (0 .7%) reflects the relative 
inefficiency of these plants . The vertical line in Figure 1 
indicates the cutoff for a strict performance standard . The 
actual emissions reductions that would be achieved would 
hinge on the technology used to replace generation from 
these facilities .104
An inflexible efficiency standard applied either as a strict 
uniform reduction in heat rates (Option 1) or as a strict heat-
rate performance standard (Option 2) could be expected to 
result in marginal costs of emissions reductions that would 
vary across facilities . For example, the uniform standard 
would require facilities that are already efficient to make 
further efficiency improvements comparable to efforts at 
inefficient facilities . Meanwhile, the strict heat-rate perfor-
mance standard (Option 2) would target only the least effi-
cient facilities, even though low-cost opportunities may be 
available elsewhere in the fleet . Consequently, the cost of 
such approaches would be greater than might be achieved 
under a regulation that allowed flexibility across facilities 
to achieve the same emissions reductions at least cost .
Option 3. A market-based approach requiring a roughly 
10% reduction in CO2 emissions from coal-fired electric-
ity-generation . The 10% is based on a fleetwide 5% reduc-
tion from energy-efficiency improvements at coal-fired 
plants plus a 5% fleetwide reduction in CO2 emissions 
with the cofiring of biomass . For a cap-and-trade system 
administered at the national level, plants would receive 
allowances based on generation in a year previous to the 
start of a program . For a heat-rate-based program, the 
metric would be fossil-fuel energy input (CO2 emissions 
rate-adjusted) to kWh generation for the utility system .
A flexible standard for coal or a cap-and-trade program 
(Option 3) could potentially capture even greater gains 
if it were to allow for cofiring of coal with biomass . EPA 
104 . If the reduced generation were made up by non-emitting sources, the stan-
dard would achieve a 5% reduction overall . If it were made up by the aver-
age natural gas combined-cycle units, the standard would have to target the 
least efficient 7 .22% of heat input at coal plants (11,416 Btu per KWh) . See 
Appendix, for discussion .
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identifies emissions-reduction opportunities from cofir-
ing of 2-5%, on average, across the fleet, in addition to 
the 2-5% they identify from the heat-rate improvements 
discussed above .105 However, the geographic opportunity 
for biomass cofiring may be even more uneven than the 
opportunities for efficiency improvements . The ability to 
cofire depends in part on the configuration of the boiler 
and, importantly, on the availability of local, low-cost bio-
mass . A flexible efficiency standard calibrated to reduce 
coal-heat input by 10% per unit of electricity generated by 
coal could capture potential improvements in efficiency 
and from biomass cofiring . The net effect on emissions 
from the electricity sector would depend on whether this 
led to greater use of some coal- or natural gas-fired facili-
ties . However, a standard of this nature would be likely to 
result in an overall emissions reduction of roughly 3% of 
total U .S . CO2 emissions .
An investigation of the effects of a flexible performance 
standard requires modeling that is beyond the scope of 
this Article . Nonetheless, such an approach is a possible 
outcome if EPA were to implement a standard for existing 
emissions sources under §111(d) . The Agency might iden-
tify an average heat-rate improvement that would apply 
across the industry but allow flexibility in the implemen-
tation of the standard . Tradable performance standards 
have been used previously under the CAA, including, for 
example, in the phaseout of lead in gasoline .106 Such an 
approach would be likely to capture relatively low-cost 
opportunities for efficiency improvements by introducing 
a price on CO2; thereby, such an approach is expected to 
reduce the overall cost of the program . Flexible compli-
ance options might lead to the retirement of some of the 
least efficient plants, but it also would allow improvements 
across the spectrum where it is least expensive to achieve 
the overall industrywide performance standard .
The Appendix illustrates that similar opportunities may 
exist in the fleet of natural gas turbines and steam natural 
gas units, although these plants are used much less inten-
sively than coal plants are . Turbine efficiency has benefited 
from the aeronautic revolution in the 1980s, but many 
turbines with heat rates more than double that of a new 
turbine remain in service . Steam gas units also display a 
right-hand tail in their distribution of heat-rate efficiency . 
Although their heat rates are roughly comparable to the 
rates at coal plants, the CO2 content per Btu of gas is less 
than one-half of that for coal .
The most ambitious effort plausible under the NSPS 
program would be a sectoral cap-and-trade program that 
would allow trading across fuel types . To accomplish this, 
the Agency would have to redefine the regulated emis-
sions source category to include all fossil-fired electricity-
generating units or allow trading across existing-source 
categories . An Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
105 . U .S . EPA, Technical Supporting Document for the ANPRM: Sta-
tionary Sources, supra note 92, at 16-17 .
106 . Richard G . Newell & Kristian Rogers, Leaded Gasoline in the United States: 
The Breakthrough of Permit Trading, in Choosing Environmental Policy 
(W . Harrington et al . eds ., 2004) .
analysis of an economywide cap-and-trade program under 
H .R . 2454 provides a useful indication of what might be 
achieved from the electricity sector under a sectoral cap .107 
By 2020, EIA projects that H .R . 2454 would achieve emis-
sions reductions of 10 .4% from coal-fired power plants 
compared to 2009 levels .108 For the entire electricity sector, 
emissions in 2020 would fall by 11 .4% from their 2009 
levels . This constitutes a 4 .6% reduction in total national 
emissions . The EIA modeling does not incorporate endoge-
nous improvements in the operational efficiency of existing 
units . Instead, those reductions occur from exogenous tech-
nological change, a shift in investments to lower emitting 
sources of generation, and fuel-switching .109 In contrast, 
the opportunities for emissions reductions from coal- and 
gas-fired plants that we illustrate above are explicitly the 
result of improvements in the operational efficiency of 
existing units . If EPA were able to expand the definition of 
source category to include all fossil-fired electricity-gener-
ating units, it should encourage emissions reductions from 
operational efficiency as well as through fuel-switching . 
Nonetheless, this comparison poses some questions for the 
Agency . If opportunities for improvements in operational 
efficiency remain available today given existing fuel prices, 
could an increase in fuel prices resulting from an emissions 
cap be expected to harvest those improvements? Would a 
tradable performance standard capture different types of 
emissions reductions than a cap-and-trade program?
In summary, substantial emission-reduction opportuni-
ties appear available from existing power plants under the 
CAA §111(d) NSPS authority . Moreover, incentive-based 
approaches that place an explicit price on CO2 should do a 
better job of capturing emissions reductions than uniform, 
strict performance standards .
V. Conclusion
The CAA provides a well-known, long-standing, and 
broadly effective set of regulatory tools . It has been suf-
ficiently flexible to regulate a wide variety of pollutants 
with diverse effects, physical characteristics, and roles in 
the economy . Great skepticism has been expressed, how-
ever, about whether the CAA is up to the task of regulating 
GHGs . Our analysis indicates that, at least in some limited 
but meaningful ways, the statute remains a powerful and 
flexible tool for this new challenge . Moreover, absent leg-
islative intervention, regulation under the CAA will move 
forward; ultimately, this regulation could achieve substan-
tial emissions reductions .
107 . EIA, Energy Market and Economic Impacts of H .R . 2454, the Ameri-
can Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, SR/OIAF/2009-05 (2009), 
http://www .eia .doe .gov/oiaf/servicerpt/hr2454/pdf/sroiaf(2009)05 .pdf .
108 . In the absence of the program, coal-fired power plant emissions would be 
expected to grow by 12 .5% from 2009 to 2020 .
109 . It also includes only limited demand-response because the change in elec-
tricity prices is small as a result of the free allocation to local distribution 
companies . This probably resembles what could be achieved by a sectoral 
program under the NSPS program . As noted above, EPA would not have 
the authority to run an auction for emissions allowances, although if alloca-
tion decisions are delegated to the states, they could do so .
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To be sure, we are convinced that new legislation targeted 
specifically at GHGs would be superior to an approach 
based purely on the CAA. Because fossil-based energy is 
such an important part of our economy, we need to move 
away from it in a careful fashion. New legislation could 
capture the lowest cost-emissions reductions via economy-
wide carbon pricing and incorporate international offsets, 
among many advantages over a CAA-only approach.
Nevertheless, our analysis suggests that even a modest 
regulatory program using a well-worn and well-known 
CAA pathway—the NSPS—is capable of producing real 
reductions in emissions by targeting efficiency gains in the 
coal-electricity sector.110 Incorporation of trading mecha-
nisms into this NSPS approach is legally plausible, would 
reduce costs, and would unlock further emissions cuts via 
biomass cofiring or (slightly less plausibly) fuel-switching 
from coal to natural gas.
Our analysis of just the one source category, coal-
fired electricity-generating units, indicates that an NSPS 
approach including gains from coal-plant efficiency and 
biomass cofiring could achieve reductions of roughly 3% 
of total national emissions. It is worth noting that these 
emissions reductions are associated with a relatively mod-
est NSPS approach. CAA regulation that expands on a 
narrow NSPS program by modifying source categories 
or allows trading across source categories in the electric-
ity sector to permit fuel-switching, for example, might be 
able to capture significantly more emissions reductions. By 
comparison, we infer from EIA analysis that an electricity-
sector cap comparable in stringency and cost to the Wax-
110. Further opportunities for emissions reductions exist in other sectors of the 
economy beyond the electricity sector. For example, the figure stated above 
does not include emissions reductions from the transportation sector associ-
ated with EPA’s regulations under other provisions of the CAA—regulations 
that most comprehensive climate proposals in Congress leave intact.
man-Markey analysis could achieve emissions reductions 
of 11.4% in the electricity sector in 2020—a reduction 
equal to 4.6% of total national emissions in 2009—with 
a substantial portion of those reductions banked for com-
pliance in future years.111 The greatest area of uncertainty 
with a CAA NSPS approach is cost. Estimates of costs 
would require a modeling exercise that is unfortunately 
beyond the scope of this Article. Because the NSPS pro-
gram we identify is relatively modest, capturing known 
opportunities for emissions reduction (efficiency and bio-
mass cofiring), it is our sense that costs are likely to be 
modest as well. Costs will clearly be lower if NSPS regula-
tion includes some form of trading.
To many observers, incentive-based approaches adopted 
through new climate legislation are viewed as a discrete 
alternative to prescriptive approaches that are common 
under the CAA. But these alternatives may not be mutu-
ally exclusive. As we have discussed, various provisions of 
the CAA offer opportunities to introduce flexibility—and 
thereby to realize at least a portion of the potential cost sav-
ings associated with incentive-based approaches—though 
an economywide emissions trading program created by 
new legislation would reduce costs even further.
In short, this analysis leads us to conclude that the 
CAA—and specifically, NSPS—despite being a subopti-
mal vehicle for GHG regulation, is nevertheless a know-
able, practical, and effective one. Furthermore, until and 
unless Congress passes new legislation, the CAA is the tool 
we have. It appears that this tool remains very useful, even 
if it cannot finish the job alone.
111. See EIA, Energy Market and Economic Impacts of H.R. 2454, supra 
note 107.
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Appendix
A. Explaining the Variation in Heat Rates at Coal-
Fired Boilers
One plausible explanation for the distribution of heat rates 
is that performance characteristics may vary by technology .
Figures 3-6 illustrate the distribution of heat rates for 
the four most important types of boilers: tangentially fired, 
wall-fired, cyclone, and fluidized bed . These boilers exhibit 
similar distributions of heat rates, so at a qualitative level, 
technology does not appear to explain the distribution in 
plant efficiency .
Figure 3. Coal Tangential Boilers—Heat  
Input-Weighted Heat Rates
Figure 4. Coal Wall Boilers—Heat  
Input-Weighted Heat Rates
Figure 5. Coal Cyclone Boilers—Heat  
Input-Weighted Heat Rates
Figure 6. Coal Fluidized Bed—Heat  
Input-Weighted Heat Rates
Another possible explanation is that these outliers 
represent older plants, perhaps smaller plants with lower 
capacity-utilization rates . To investigate this, we plot the 
distribution of heat input by vintage in Figure 7 . The 
curves in the top panel of the figure represent density dis-
tribution functions, and the area under the curves sum to 
one . One curve represents the heat input-weighted distri-
bution by vintage of 95% of existing coal-fired plants that 
are relatively more efficient; the other curve represents the 
distribution for the least efficient plants—those with a heat 
rate above 11,609 Btu per kWh . Although both curves are 
irregular, the curve representing heat input at the ineffi-
cient units appears to lie somewhat to the left of the distri-
bution for all plants, indicating that these plants tend to be 
older units .112 However, plants that are relatively inefficient 
continued to be built throughout this time-horizon . The 
bottom panel represents cumulative distribution functions . 
Moving from left to right, the curves illustrate the portion 
of plants in each category that are younger than a given 
112 . The vintage indicates the year of initial commercial operation .
Note: FBC, fluidized bed combustion .
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vintage. This figure illustrates that the less efficient plants 
tend to be older, but 40% of the heat input at inefficient 
plants occurs at plants that were built after 1975.
Figure 7. Coal Steam Boilers—Distribution of 
Heat Rate by Vintage
Yet another factor that might explain the relative perfor-
mance of plants could be the type of fuel available. Coals 
vary according to moisture content and other measures of 
quality. Table 1 describes the fuel-use characteristics of the 
least efficient plants and indicates that the least efficient 5% 
of generation uses a variety of coal types. The coal types 
that are most affected are lignite (42% of total lignite used) 
and waste coal (18%), but these coal types account for only 
a small portion of the total coal used among the facilities 
that would be affected by the regulation—lignite repre-
sents only 7%, and waste coal only 3% of fuel use at the 
least efficient generators. The remaining 90% of fuel used 
is distributed proportionally according to the contribution 
of each fuel to total generation.
Finally, we look at the existence of flue-gas desulfuriza-
tion equipment (scrubbers). These post-combustion con-
trols to reduce SO2 emissions cost hundreds of millions 
of dollars, so one would expect them to be less common 
at plants that are relatively inefficient. For the entire fleet, 
about 61% of heat input occurs at units with post-com-
bustion controls for SO2, whereas 35% of the fuel use at 
the least efficient plants is at plants that have such equip-
ment.113 This finding is consistent with expectations, yet it 
is nonetheless surprising that more than one-third of the 
least efficient generation occurs at units with SO2 controls.
Based on this qualitative analysis, no single simple fac-
tor explains the variation in heat rates across plants, and 
particularly the surprising right-hand tail. Other factors—
including operational practice, general maintenance, or 
the introduction of electronic-combustion controls in the 
boiler—may explain lingering opportunities for improve-
ments in plant efficiency as a way to reduce CO2 emissions 
from electricity-generating units.
B. The Geographic Distribution of Less Efficient 
Generation at Coal-Fired Boilers
A standard requiring a uniform 5% improvement in 
heat rate at every plant (Option 1) would have a diffuse 
effect across the nation. Figure 8 illustrates where emis-
sions reductions would occur, represented as a fraction of 
total electricity-generation to indicate where the reduction 
would be a relatively important part of overall electricity-
113. A little more than one-half of the heat input at the least efficient units that 
have SO2 controls in place is at units with wet scrubbers. Among all units 
with SO2 controls, wet scrubbers are in place for more than 86% of the 
heat input.































Bituminous 489 750,968,640 37.39% 788,268,928 75 20,055,258 2.67% 23.25% 26,228,603 3.33%
Bituminous & 
subbituminous 357 701,144,960 34.91% 746,669,568 64 32,573,522 4.65% 37.76% 41,028,115 5.49%
Lignite 5 14,029,976 0.70% 16,262,573 2 5,873,214 41.86% 6.81% 7,118,209 43.77%
Lignite & 
subbituminous 30 108,432,520 5.40% 122,885,184 2 4,852,081 4.47% 5.62% 5,981,477 4.87%
Subbituminous 159 418,986,528 20.86% 462,743,072 23 20,273,054 4.84% 23.50% 25,411,746 5.49%
Waste coal 28 14,754,307 0.73% 16,793,920 6 2,643,915 17.92% 3.06% 3,397,136 20.23%
TOTAL  2,008,316,931 100% 2,153,623,245  86,271,044 4.30% 100% 109,165,287 5.07%
Table 1. Changes in Use of Coal-Fired Units by Fuel Type
Vintage
Vintage
Least efficient units (5% of heat output) All other units (95% of heat output)
Least efficient units (5% of heat output) All other units (95% of heat output)
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the greatest burden of emissions reductions under a strict 
performance standard would occur elsewhere.
Figure 9. Coal Plants—Strict 5% Greater  
Efficiency Performance Standard
A strict heat-rate efficiency performance standard could 
have consequences. If electricity-generation were reduced 
from the least efficient coal-fired facilities, it might be 
replaced by an increase at other emitting facilities. Natural 
gas-fired generation is the second-most-important form of 
electricity-generation after coal and is expected to grow in 
the future, especially in light of emerging climate policy. 
To achieve the 5% net emissions reductions, assuming that 
all reductions in generation are made up by an increase in 
generation at the average natural gas combined-cycle power 
plant, the performance standard for coal-fired generation 
would be set at 11,416 Btu per kWh, directly affecting 7.22% 
of the heat input at the least efficient coal-fired plants. Fig-
ure 10 illustrates that the states in the upper plains region 
remain most directly affected by such regulation.
Figure 10. Coal Plants—Strict 7.2% Greater  
Efficiency Standard
generation. This view makes it appear that the burden of 
such a standard would be distributed in a fairly uniform 
way across the country. Clearly, such an approach would 
not be cost-effective, because a strict uniform reduction in 
heat input that was not tradable would not take advantage 
of opportunities at plants that currently are least efficient 
and could be expected to have the least-cost opportunity to 
reduce emissions. Moreover, it would require the same per-
centage reductions in heat input at the most efficient plants, 
even though these plants may already have exhausted all 
cost-effective opportunities for reductions.
Figure 8. Coal Plants—Uniform 5% Efficiency 
Improvement
A strict efficiency performance standard might specify 
a maximum heat rate for coal-fired boilers. A standard set 
equal to the 95th percentile of existing plants would be 
set at 11,609 Btu per kWh. The vertical line in Figure 1 
indicates the cutoff for a strict performance standard; the 
plants to the right of this line with heat rates in excess of 
11,609 Btu per kWh are those represented in Figure 9. The 
scale in this figure represents the heat input that would be 
reduced in each state, divided by the total electricity-gener-
ation in that state. This scale illustrates the degree to which 
the reduction in heat input represents an important part 
of overall electricity-generation in the state. Much of the 
generation that would be affected is located in the upper 
plains states. South Dakota is the outlier, with a value of 
nearly 4,000 Btu per kWh of total electricity-generation. 
Although Figure 2 and Figure 8 illustrate that coal-fired 
generation is not a large share of electricity-generation in 
the state compared with other states, Figure 9 indicates that 
the state hosts a relatively large share of inefficient plants. 
The next state that would be most affected is Wyoming, 
with a value of approximately 3,000 Btu per kWh, and 
other states in the upper plains also would be affected. So, 
although most of the coal used for electricity-generation is 
consumed east of the Mississippi River, and the state with 
the greatest total quantity of coal-fired generation is Texas, 
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efficient and more heavily used. There is relatively little 
opportunity to improve a specific turbine, short of com-
plete refurbishment, and most turbines are used only for 
peak-period generation and have relatively few emissions 
overall. Figure 12 illustrates the operational efficiency of 
steam natural gas units, many of which have greater heat 
input than the average turbine and offer greater technical 
opportunities for efficiency improvements.
C. Variation in Natural Gas-Fired Plant Efficiency
A brief look at the distribution of natural gas-fired elec-
tricity-generation illustrates a similar distribution of opera-
tional efficiency. Figure 11 illustrates the distribution for 
natural gas turbines. In this case, heat-rate efficiency is 
likely to be closely related to vintage. Facilities built since 
the aeronautic revolution in turbines in the 1980s are more 
Figure 11. Natural Gas Turbine—Heat Input-
Weighted Heat Rates
Figure 12. Natural Gas Steam—Heat Input-
Weighted Heat Rates
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